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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent~
-vs.-

Case No. 10187

VERNON HOWARD CANNON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
The appellant appeals, challenging his conviction to the
crime of automobile homicide in violation of 76-30-7.4,
Utah Code Annotated 1953.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was tried by jury trial on the crime
charged in the information, to-wit: automobile homicide.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent, State of Utah, submits the conviction
should be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement of facts:
The appellant, Vernon Howard Cannon, was charged

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
with the crime of automobile homicide in that it was alleged
that the appellant operated his motor vehicle while intoxicated, resulting in the death of Fleming Christensen. The
evidence disclosed that the appellant, Vernon Howard
Cannon, 54, was the co-owner with a Mr. Robert E. Lee
of the Parley's Canyon Cafe located above Mountain Dell
Reservoir in Salt Lake County (R. 194, 195, 226). On the
night of the 21st of October, 1963, Cannon left his usual
employment and went to the Parley's Canyon Cafe at approximately 6:00P.M. (R. 230). Subsequently, he and
Mr. Lee made a journey in search of an employee of the
cafe and went to Keetley, Park City, Kimball's Junction,
Fort Ute, and returned to the cafe at approximately 8:10
P.M. (R. 197-200). Thereafter, Mr. Cannon ate in the
trailer of Mr. Lee; had some coffee and then started down
Parley's Canyon ( R. 202, 203) .
Franklin Lester Hewlett, Fleming Christensen and Gary
F. Barrus had been playing basketball and visiting friends
(R. 94) and were driving home in a Morris Miner Station
Wagon being driven by the Hewlett boy. All three boys
were 17 years of age (R. 93). Fleming Christensen was
sitting in the front seat opposite the driver and Gary Barrus
was sitting in the rear seat behind the Hewlett boy (R. 9394). They headed north on Wasatch Boulevard and stopped
at the intersection of 33rd South and Wasatch Boulevard
for a stoplight (R. 94, 98, 106). As the light changed, the
three boys proceeded north on Wasatch Boulevard and
pulled into the outside right-hand lane (R. 98). Wasatch
Boulevard is a four lane highway with two lanes each way
and the road dips between 33rd South and the Parley's
Canyon Interchange. Each lane on one side is separated
by dotted white lines ( R. 69) and two wide yellow lines

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

separate the opposing lanes of traffic (R. 68). The road is
blacktopped and there are semaphores at 33rd South on
the south and the Parley's Canyon Interchange on the north
(R. 70). As the Morris Miner vehicle proceeded north on
Wasatch Boulevard, the appellant, operating a 1961 Chevrolet, drove down Parley's Canyon, stopped at the semaphore at the Parley's Canyon Interchange with Wasatch
Boulevard (R. 233) and proceeded south on Wasatch
Boulevard. The appellant's vehicle appeared to stop at the
dip between the interchange and 33rd South and head off
toward the west outside lane of traffic ( R. 112) . Appellant
then started up, crossed east into the south lane of traffic and
made several directional changes back and forth in an
apparent effort to correct himself ( R. 113 ) . The vehicle
then started to accelerate rapidly up the hill, looked like it
was going to hit a grain truck which was also proceeding
south on Wasatch Boulevard, then veered across the double
line into the northbound lane of traffic, striking the Morris
Miner Station Wagon head-on (R. 95, 98, 113, 114). As a
result of the collision, Fleming Christensen and Franklin
Hewlett were killed ( R. 11 7) . Gary Barrus sustained injuries and was knocked unconscious (R. 95). Immediately
after the accident, Mr. George W. Golightly, who observed
the accident, went to the Chevrolet which the appellant
had been driving to offer assistance (R. 100). He detected
an odor of alcohol on the appellant's breath (R. 101) and
indicated that the appellant appeared in shock (R. 105).
The impact of the collision caused both vehicles to
change direction so that when they came to rest, the Chevrolet was pointing north and the Morris Miner Station
Wagon, which had been knocked on its side, was pointing
south (Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 12). A 40-foot skid mark from the
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rear wheel of the Chevrolet to the point of impact was measured by sheriff's officers ( R. 77 ) .
The appellant was taken to the Salt Lake County
Hospital and at 11:54 p.m., approximately an hour and
forty-four minutes after the accident, a blood sample was
taken from the appellant by Dr. Burton Janis (R. 120, 124).
The blood sample was taken by sterile syringe (R. 121) and
the blood placed in a bottle provided by Officer Jack Retallick of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office (R. 121, 123).
Officer Retallick had obtained the vial from a cabinet in the
County Hospital (R. 135). The vial appeared empty and
after the blood was placed in it, it was sealed and taped
( R. 13 7) . Officer Retallick put the sample in his coat, took
it home and placed it in his refrigerator and the next day, in
the company of Officer VanRoosendaal, took the sample
to the State Chemist's office ( R. 140). Mr. H. Kent Francis,
the State Chemist, performed the Harger blood alcohol
test upon the blood sample and determined the percentage
of alcohol to blood to be .193 per cent. The vial containing
the blood was sealed at the time it was delivered to Dr.
Francis (R. 148).
Dr. Stewart C. Harvey, a pharmacologist at the University of Utah Medical School, testified at the time of trial
that the driving ability of most everyone would be impaired
with a blood alcohol level of .1 0 ( R. 169) . He testified that
it would take approximately 13 ounces of whiskey to raise
a person's blood alcohol level to .193. He further indicated
that the normal body processes bum up or metabolize approximately .015 to .030 per cent of alcohol per hour. He
further indicated that, generally, absorption will be complete approximately one hour after consumption and that
in order to ascertain the blood alcohol level at the time of an
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accident, it is important to know when consumption occurred (R. 177).
The defendant offered the testimony of Mr. Robert E.
Lee to the effect that he was with the appellant prior to the
time that he drove down Parley's Canyon and was involved
in the accident. He testified concerning the trip in search
of their employee and indicated that during the trip the
appellant had had coffee (R. 199) and that subsequently
he ate beef stew and drank addditional coffee ( R. 202, 203).
Mr. Lee indicated that he had been drinking himself earlier
in the evening and, therefore, could not smell alcohol on the
breath of others (R. 207). He stated that it would have
been possible for the appellant to have been drinking during
the evening and he did not know whether the appellant had
been drinking or not ( R. 214, 216) . He did not see the a ppellant take a drink during the time he was in his company.
He testified, however, that he had "no idea" that the appellant "had consumed" liquor ( R. 202, 204) .
Theilda Lee, wife of Robert Lee, testified that she saw
the appellant at the Parley's Canyon Cafe at approximately
6:00P.M. and did not smell liquor on his breath. At no
time did she see him take any liquor ( R. 220). Subsequently, after returning from the trip with her husband, he
ate with them and watched TV and she did not notice the
appellant drinking nor smell alcohol on his breath.
The appellant admitted consuming part of a pint of
whiskey, which he said was about one-half full, which was
in his car. The appellant indicated that he drank the whiskey on the way down Parley's Canyon. He stated he stopped
after leaving the restaurant at a point about three miles
from the restaurant and five miles from the Parley's Interchange semaphore. He testified that he remembered stop-
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ping at the semaphore, but did not remember anything
thereafter. The alcohol he drank, he claimed, was 86 Proof.
After the accident, he was of the opinion that he had gone
to sleep and run off the road ( R. 235) , although he told
police officers that he either fell asleep or "passed out" (R.
128). Dr. Gordon R. Evans testified that if eight ounces
of 100 Proof alcohol had been consumed approximately ten
to fifteen minutes before the accident, that the appellant
would have had at the time of the accident a blood alcohol
level of between .02 and .03. He further indicated that the
appellant would have had good judgment had he merely
had a mild dosage of alcohol absorption. He indicated that
if eight ounces of 100 Proof alcohol were consumed, that
the blood alcohol level after full absorption would be .191
(R. 252). However, the Doctor indicated that this computation did not take into consideration body metabolism or
oxidation and that oxidation during the period of absorption would probably be .04 (R. 267).
The appellant's sister was called as a witness and testified that in March 1962, the appellant had had an illness
which affected his inner ear (R. 191 ) . The appellant himself testified that at that time he had "Meniere's disease."
The disease he characterized as causing a loss of balance
( R. 228) . The disease lasted approximately three months
( R. 229) . Dr. Evans treated the appellant for the disease
and also characterized the disease as causing the loss of
balance, but indicated that it does not result in unconsciousness or an unawareness of what is occurring. He
further testified that alcohol does not necessarily aggravate
the disease (R. 256). He last saw the appelllant when treating him for the disease in October, 1962, approximately a
year prior to the accident. Dr. D. C. Bernson testified that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
he made a neurological examination of the appellant after
the accident and was of the opinion that he had suffered a
cerebral contusion which caused the loss of consciousness.
He felt that, generally, someone who had had Meniere's
disease would know that it was occurring. He indicated
that there was no evidence of Meniere's disease having
occurred, but that if it was not in progress, he would have
been unable to detect its occurring ( R. 286, 288) . Subsequent to the completion of the testimony, the trial court
struck all evidence relating to Meniere's disease.
Based upon the above evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
GRANTING THE STATE'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO MENIERE'S DISEASE.

The appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting the State's motion to strike the evidence relating to the
appellant having had Meniere's disease. The motion to
strike was made at the end of the appellant's case and prior
to the time the case was submitted to the jury. It is submitted that the basis upon which the appellant claims the
court erred is without legal foundation. The evidence that
had been received by the court relating to the appellant's
affliction with Meniere's disease, it is submitted, was too
remote and speculative to warrant the jury considering it
and the court acted within its sound discretion in granting
the State's motion to strike.
The appellant's sister, Harriett Snarr, testified that the
appellant had had an illness which affected his inner ear
and that the affliction had occurred in March, 1962. The
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appellant himself did not testify with reference to suffering
from Meniere's disease at the time of the accident. His
testimony was to the effect that he had not suffered from the
disease or sought medical attention since October, 1962,
approximately one year prior to the time of the accident
which occurred on October 21, 1963. Mr. and Mrs. Robert
Lee, who were with the appellant in the hours immediately
preceding the accident, gave no evidence in support of the
proposition that the appellant was in any way suffering
from Meniere's disease. The appellant's testimony was to
the effect that he thought he had fallen asleep at the interchange light at Parley's Canyon and Wasatch Boulevard.
At the time he was in the hospital, subsequent to the accident, he told the investigating officers that he either passed
out or fell asleep. The examining physicians indicated that
there was no evidence that the appellant was suffering from
Meniere's disease at the time of the examination immediately subsequent to the accident. Dr. Gordon Evans, who
treated the defendant for his affliction, described the disease
as one involving the loss of balance, but indicated that unconsciousness did not result and that a person so affiicted is
generally aware of what he is doing. The only evidence
tending to support the appellant's claim of relevancy was
that the disease was a chronic or recurrent disease which
could occur after periods of lapse. Consequently, there was
no affirmative evidence of the appellant having suffered the
effects of Meniere's disease within a period of one year prior
to the accident. There was no affirmative evidence of any
kind that the appellant had suffered from Meniere's disease
at the time of the accident. It would be speculation and
inference upon inference to conclude that the accident had
been caused by Meniere's disease. The appellant by his
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own testimony evidenced no manifestations of the disease.
Evidence was offered at the trial that the appellant's
memory was impeded by retrogressive amnesia. It would be
necessary to support error to infer that:
1. The appellant's loss of consciousness did not in fact
take place until after the accident.
2. That the chronic and recurrent disease which had
not afflicted the appellant for over a year had suddenly struck him and that it had immediately subsided between the time of the accident and the time
which he was examined at the hospital.
Further, it would be necessary to infer that the appellant
had no recollection of any of the events which might have
been precipitated by the disease.
The appellant's principle argument in support of his contention that the trial court erred in striking the evidence
are legal arguments unrelated to the posture of this case.
It is admitted that generally a motion to strike comes too
late if it appears that the evidence, when offered on its face,
is inadmissible. Further, it is admitted that a party may not
usually avail himself of a motion to strike evidence which
he offers. However, in this case, neither of these rules are
applicable. The first evidence which came in unobjected to
relating to Meniere's disease was evidence from the appellant's sister. Further, the evidence that appellant had in
fact suffered from Meniere's disease, which was offered by
the appellant himself, would appear to be relevant at first
blush and would appear to be the type of evidence which
would be connected up by other evidence tending to show
its relationship to the event involved. The evidence, therefore, was not that type of evidence which at first blush
would warrant the prosecution in opposing its receipt. However, after examination into the nature of the disease and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
the facts surrounding the appellant's condition, it became
apparent that there was no basis, except remote speculation, to warrant the evidence remaining before the jury.
It appearing that the necessary connecting evidence had
not come forth, a motion to strike was proper.
Secondly, the prosecution did not offer affirmative evidence of Meniere's disease which would preclude their
making the motion to strike. The prosecution merely crossexamined one of the appellant's doctors concerning the
pathology of the disease. The evidence offered in no way
tended to remove the speculative and remote nature of the
evidence then before the court. Consequently, it was apparent that at the end of the reception of the evidence, the testimony relating to Meniere's disease was of a remote and
speculative nature. In such circumstances, it is within the
sound discretion of the court to grant a motion to strike.
It is generally recognized that a motion to strike rests
within the sound discretion of the court. See State v. LopezJ
55 N.M. 560, 237 P.2d 591. In 23A, C.J.S., Criminal LawJ
§ 1069, p. 45, it is stated:
"The grant or refusal of a motion to strike improper
evidence may be viewed as a matter within the sound
discretion of the court, as where the evidence was admitted without objection, see infra. § 1070. Thus a
motion to strike evidence because of facts elicited on
cross-examination showing it to be incompetent has
been held to be discretionary with the court. Even
though evidence may be considered technically relevant, if it is only remotely relevant to the main issues
and might tend to lead the jury down a collateral issue
or might tend to subject them to some prejudice, a
proper exercise of judicial discretion may require that
it be stricken."
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Since the evidence in the instant case was substantially
remote and since the appellant himself as well as the medical evidence offered tended to show that at no time surrounding the accident did he suffer from Meniere's syndrome, the trial court properly struck the evidence since it
would tend to "lead the jury down a collateral issue."
Further, it is well settled that the question of whether or not
evidence should be received or considered by a jury when
the evidence is remote to the issue at hand, is a matter
within the sound discretion of the trial court. In State v.
Schuman, 151 Kan. 749, 100P.2d 706 (1940), the Kansas
Supreme Court noted:
"***A ruling on the competency of evidence, based
upon remoteness, ordinarily rests in the discretion of
the trial court and will not be reversed unless it clearly
appears the ruling constituted an abuse of sound judicial discretion. * * *"
Numerous other cases support that statement, State v.
Jaynes, 165 Ore. 321, 107 P.2d 528; State v. Moore, 35
Wash. 2d 106,211 P.2d 172;State v. Thomas, 8 Wash. 2d
573, 113 P.2d 73; Dickey v. State, 97 Okla. Cr. 28, 257 P.2d
319; People v. Bjornsen, 79 Cal. 2d 519, 180 P.2d 443;
People v. Boggess, 194 Cal. 212, 228 Pac. 448.
In State v. Cody, 361 P.2d 307 (Okla. Cr. 1961), the
court noted that where the defendant sought to offer testimony of a doctor to show the prosecutrix's mental condition
a few years before the occurrence of the crime was properly
excluded as being too remote to have probative value. In
People v. MacArthur, 125 Cal. App. 2d 212, 270 P.2d 37
( 1954), the appellant contended it was error in crossexamining a State's witness for the court to exclude examination in a narcotics case as to appellant's lack of access.
In rejecting the contention the court indicated:
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"* * * The trial judge has wide discretion in determining the relevancy of evidence, Spolter v. FourWheel Brake Service Co., 99 Cal.App.2d 690, 222
P.2d 307; Gladstone v. Fortier, 22 Cal.App.2d 1, 70
P.2d 255. Whether or not evidence is too remote is for
the trial court which is vested with a wide discretion in
making such decisions. * * *"
In Butler v. State, 352 S.W.2d 744 (Texas Crim. 1962),
the defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated.
On appeal, he cited as error the failure of the court to allow
hospital records into evidence which would show a physical
condition of his stomach which would have been inconsistent with his drinking. The court ruled that the trial
court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the evidence where the records reflected that the condition for
which he was treated did not involve his hospitalization
until some seven months after the accident. The court felt
this was sufficiently remote to the charge to allow the trial
court to exclude the evidence. In the instant case, the evidence was even further remote and there was additional
evidence before the court tending to negative any inference
that the previous condition had reoccurred at the time of
the accident. See also 22A, C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 638.
In 22A, C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 639, it is stated:
"Evidence may be excluded when it is such as to
furnish a basis for nothing more than a mere conjecture
with reference to the transaction under investigation.
* * *"
The appellant has called the court's attention to the case
of State v. Gooze, 14 N.J. Supr. 277, 81 A.2d 811 ( 1951).
That case in no way is relevant or of any precedent in favor
of the appellant. There the defendant \vas convicted of
negligent homicide and the conviction was affirmed on
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appeal. There was no evidence of any alcohol or intoxication being involved. The defendant suffered from Meniere's
syndrome and had been warned by his doctor not to drive.
Thereafter, he did drive, had an attack resulting in the accident causing death. The appellate court confirmed the conviction on the grounds that the defendant's negligence in
driving with Meniere's syndrome was sufficient to make his
conduct criminal. A reading of the case clearly demonstrates the medical testimony offered in that case was different than in the instant case and the evidence was exclusively that the accident was caused by Meniere's syndrome.
The case has no merit in this appeal.
Finally, it is submitted that the trial court acted properly
in exercising its discretion to strike the evidence on the
grounds that the appellant failed to connect the evidence
relating to Meniere's syndrome to the circumstances of the
accident. The testimony by all persons concerned would
exclude the inferences that Meniere's syndrome could have
been responsible for the appellant's conduct:
1. Persons who saw the appellant immediately preceding the accident detected no physical upset.
2. The appellant admitted the heavy consumption
of alcohol.
3. Alcohol will not precipitate Meniere's syndrome
although it may aggravate a loss of balance occurring during an attack of Meniere's syndrome.
4. The appellant's testimony was to the effect that
he fell asleep.
5. His admission to the police officers was that he fell
asleep or passed out.
6. There was no neurological evidence of the appellant having suffered from Meniere's syndrome.
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7. Meniere's syndrome is not characterized by loss of
consciousness which appeared to either result prior
to the accident or as a result of the accident.
8. The last serious attack of the appellant of the disease occurred in March 1962 and he was last seen
by his doctor in October, 1962, some one year prior
to the accident.
As a consequence of the above factors, it is clear that
the appellant failed to connect the evidence relating to
Meniere's disease to the accident.
In Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed.,§ 1871, it is noted that a
motion to strike is a proper remedy to exclude evidence
which the offering party has failed to connect up with the
issues in the case. This motion may be made at any time,
but is most appropriate at the end of the case where full
opportunity has been given to demonstrate relevancy or
materiality and there has been a failure in that regard.
It is obvious, therefore, that the trial court did not commit error nor abuse its discretion in striking from the record
and from the jury's consideration the evidence relating to
Meniere's disease.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO
EVIDENCE THE RESULTS OF THE APPELLANT'S BLOOD
ALCOHOL TEST.

A. Accuracy of the Test.
The appellant challenges the admissibility of the results
of his blood alcohol test on the grounds that there was no
proper foundation laid and that it did not appear that the
test was conducted under circumstances which would guarantee reasonable accuracy. A simple reading of the record
discloses the manifest absurdity of such an allegation. At
the outset, it should be noted that at the time Exhibits 1, 2
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and 3 were offered which relate to the appellant's blood
sample, an objection was raised but it was not made specific.
No challenge was made to the lack of foundation or the
remoteness of the exhibit in the objection made by the appellant's counsel. In State v. Warren, 75 Ariz. 123, 252 P.2d
781 ( 1953), the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that where
an appellant had failed to make specific his objection to the
receipt of chemical evidence indicating intoxication at the
time of trial and where he sought to challenge the admissibility of such evidence because of the lack of reliability of
the test and proper measures being taken to insure its accuracy, that the failure to specifically object and adequately
state his grounds precluded consideration of the issue on
appeal. It would appear that the appellant's point on this
issue should fail for the same reason ( R. 182) .
An analysis of the record makes it manifest that the blood
sample was properly taken from the appellant and appropriately handled by all persons, including the State
Chemist who performed the test. Dr. Burton Janis took the
blood sample from the defendant which he extracted with
a prepared sterile syringe ( R. 120, 121 ) . He placed the
blood in a bottle given to him by Officer Retallick who had
obtained the bottle from a cabinet in the Salt Lake County
Hospital which was available to sheriff personnel ( R. 121,
125). The vial appeared empty and had no anti-coagulant
(R. 123, 136). Officer Retallick sealed the bottle in which
the blood was contained and placed his initials on the bottle
(R. 137). The sample was kept in his possession overnight.
He put it in his pocket after receiving it from the doctor,
carried it home where he placed it in his refrigerator. Subsequently, he took the sample, along with Officer VanRoosendaal, to the State Chemist. The sample was still
sealed when it was taken to the State Chemist's office (R.
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140, 148) . At the office of the State Chemist, H. Kent
Francis, who had performed numerous tests using the
Harger method for the detection of blood alcohol ratio,
performed the same standard test. There was no evidence
that the vial in which the appellant's blood was placed was
contaminated with any substance which would impair the
validity of the test. The procedures followed by Mr. Francis
were standard procedures for determining the alcohol content in blood samples. There was no evidence that any of
the chemicals used by the State Chemist were in any way
diluted or contrary to standard specifications. Dr. Stewart
Harvey, a pharmacologist called by the State, indicated
that if an improper measure of dichromate was used in the
process that any lack of reliability would immediately appear (R. 181). He further testified that there were anumber of built-in processes in the Harger method for catching
errors. The only evidence attacking the reliability of the
test offered by the defendant was speculative evidence to
the effect that if the chemical solutions were not properly
measured or if the vial was contaminated, the results of the
test might be affected. There was no evidence to show that
either of these "ifs" had in fact any probability of occurrence. Consequently, there is absolutely no evidence which
would tend to impeach the reliability of the test which was
performed. In Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 2, § 665,
p. 589, it is stated:
"The specimen or object must have been kept in a
proper manner after its removal from the defend~nt.
This may be shown by proof of isolation of the obJect
or specimen from other objects or specimens, or of the
proper keeping of the package or container in which
the object or specimen was kept. It has, however, been
held that lack of the safeguards which might reason-
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ably be expected does not render the testimony or report inadmissible in the absence of any evidence tending to show tampering.***"

A number of cases support the view that blood alcohol
samples are admissible after a showing that proper procedures were generally followed in the absence of affirmative evidence tending to impeach the reliability of the test.
In State v. Webb, 76 Ida. 162, 279 P.2d 634 ( 1955), the
Idaho Supreme Court had before it a challenge to the admissibility of a blood test in a similar case. It appeared that
the blood test was taken by medical technologists and that a
proper laboratory analysis was made in the customary
manner using a mixture of sulphuric acid and potassium
bichromate. In denying the claim of error by the appellant,
the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
"There was nothing in the evidence which would
even create a suspicion the blood was molested during
the analysis or that anyone who might be interested in
tampering with it had access to the hospital laboratory.
State v. Smith, Mo., 222 S. W. 455; 21 A.L.R.2d 1223n,
1237n. We believe the evidence was properly admitted.''
See also State v. Coburn, 82 Ida. 437,354 P.2d 751; State v.
Wendler, 83 Ida. 213,364 P.2d 697.
The circumstances of this case should be compared with
those in Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v. Chugg,
6 U.2d 399, 315 P.2d 277 (1957), where this court held a
blood test inadmissible. In that case, the technician was
unable to identify the sample, could not remember who
drew the sample and the sample was neither sealed nor
labeled. The court held that there was a lack of evidence
to connect the blood sample with the defendant. In Eisen-
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trager v. State, 378 P.2d 526 (Nev. 1963), the Nevada
Supreme Court ruled that where there was no evidence to
indicate that the blood sample taken from the appellant
had been tampered with or otherwise contaminated, the
evidence would be admitted.
Certainly there is a presumption of regularity when it
is shown that regular procedures and standard chemicals
are used. The fact that pre-mixed chemicals purchased
from standard drug houses are used, should create an inference that the chemicals were of proper strength since the
provisions of the Federal Food and Drug Law would prohibit the manufacture and labeling of such items if they
were to the contrary. See Toulmin, Food, Drugs, Cosmetics,
Vol. 3, § 5313 and theDrugAmendmentsActof 1962. The
appellant cites no case which would support his allegation
that the blood test in this instance should not have been
admitted. Indeed, no reasonable argument for this proposition can be sustained.
B. Remoteness.
The appellant contends that the trial court committed
error in admitting the results of the appellant's blood alcohol test because the test was taken approximately an hour
and forty-four minutes after the accident. It is submitted
that there is no merit to the appellant's contention.
The basis of the argument is that the appellant's testimony was to the effect that he consumed a half pint of 86
Proof whiskey approximately fifteen minutes before the
accident and that assuming this is so, the blood alcohol level
of the appellant at the time of the accident would have been
.02 to .03 per cent. It is submitted there are a variety of reasons why the trial court's ruling should not be disturbed.
First, the jury had before it the evidence in support of the
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appellant's contention that he had consumed only eight
ounces ( ~ pint) of liquor within a fifteen minute period
prior to the accident. They also had the testimony of the
appellant's medical witnesses that if such were true, a blood
alcohol level of .02 to .03 would have been the appellant's
condition at the time of the accident. Consequently, the
evidence of the blood alcohol test taken approximately an
hour and forty-four minutes thereafter was fully explained
from the appellant's point of view and the evidence admitted as to the level of .193 at the time of testing could
have only gone to the weight to the test and not its admissibility. It is submitted, however, that there is ample evidence from which the jury could find that the appellant was
not telling the truth when he said that he consumed the
liquor within a period immediately preceding the accident.
Dr. Stewart Harvey testified that the appellant would have
had to consume approximately 13 ounces of liquor to raise
his blood alcohol level to .193. Dr. Gordon Evans, who testified for the appellant, indicated that 8 ounces of 100 Proof
alcohol (the appellant testified the whiskey he drank was
86 Proof) would have to be consumed to raise the blood
alcohol to .191. However, Dr. Evans testified that if the
blood alcohol level was .193 an hour and forty-four minutes
after the accident, that body metabolism would have used
up .04% alcohol at 100 Proof and that the appellant would
have burned up that amount of alcohol. Consequently, the
appellant would have had to consume an amount which
would have raised his blood alcohol level without oxidation
to .23%. Thus, it is apparent that the appellant must have
consumed more liquor than what he admitted drinking.
Since the appellant apparently lied as to this action, the jury
could well have disregarded his total testimony. Further,
the evidence of alcohol on the appellant's breath at the time
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of the accident and his erratic driving behavior immediately
preceding the accident would tend to report the finding that
his level of consumption was greater than that of .02. Finally, the appellant's admission that he had fallen asleep
or "passed out" would tend to support a conclusion that the
appellant had in fact consumed enough alcohol to pass out.
Aside from these factors, Mr. Robert Lee's testimony in
several instances indicated that he had no idea that the
appellant "had" consumed liquor which, although it might
have been a slip of the tongue, could have indicated that
Mr. Lee had some information that the appellant "had"
consumed liquor (R. 202). Consequently, the jury was
under no obligation, nor was the court, to assume that the
appellant's contentions were the truth.
A number of cases have considered the issue as to whether
a blood alcohol test taken a few hours after an accident
should be admitted. Generally, they have allowed the evidence to be considered by the jury. Thus, Donigan, Chemical Tests and the Law ( 195 7) notes:
"In connection with persons operating motor vehicles while under the influence of intoxicants, it frequently happens that when they are apprehended
while in the act or after they have been involved in
traffic collisions, it is inconvenient or impossible for
one reason or another to obtain specimens of their
blood, urine, or breath for chemical analysis immedi..
ately after the event. Examples of reasons for delay
are unavailability of the testing equipment or qualified
personnel to take the specimen at the moment, the
need sometimes to travel considerable distances before
such tests can be conducted, necessity for responsible
officers to investigate at the scene of the collision and
to clear up its aftermath before giving full attention to
the inebriated driver, or the hospitalization of an
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injured subject before officers are able to request that
he submit to a chemical test. This means that sometimes the taking of specimens of body fluid or breath
for the purpose of chemical analyses may take place
several hours after the act of driving in an impaired
condition actually occurred.
"It is only logical that the sooner after the act the
specimen is taken for analysis, the more accurate will
be the estimate of blood alcohol concentration at the
time of the act in issue. But because it could not be or
was not done immediately after the event, does that
mean the result of such a chemical test is inadmissible
in subsequent litigation either civil or criminal? Our
courts have answered in the negative, unless there are
statutory time restrictions which otherwise control.
In the reported decisions in which the issue has been
raised, the lapse between the occurrence of the event
and the time of taking of a specimen for analysis has
ranged from one hour to four hours.''
In Toms v. StateJ 95 Okla. Cr. 60, 239 P.2d 812 ( 1952),
a collision occurred at 3: 30 P.M. and urine and breath tests
were taken at 5:00 P.M. The court upheld the admission
of the tests. In State v. AyresJ 70 Ida. 18, 211 P.2d 142
( 1949), the test was taken approximately three hours after
the collision and the Idaho Supreme Court held the results
admissible. See also Bowden v. StateJ 95 Okla. Cr. 382, 246
P.2d 427 ( 1952) (blood sample three hours after collision
admitted) and Wimsatt v. StateJ 139 N.E.2d 903 (Ind.
1957) (breath specimen taken two hours after arrest allowed). Many courts have allowed the results of tests taken
several hours after an incident to be admitted where there
is evidence from which the jury could extrapolate the percentage of blood alcohol at the time of the incident. State
v. StairsJ 143 Me. 245, 60 A.2d 141 ( 1948) (elapsed time
four hours); People v. AbbottJ 101 Cal. App. 2d 200, 225
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P.2d 283 (1950) (elapsed time three hours); People v.
Martinez, 38 Cal. 2d 556, 241 P.2d 224 ( 1952) (elapsed
time one and a half hours). In People v. Decasaus, 150 Cal.
App. 2d 274, 309 P.2d 835 ( 1957), a blood specimen was
taken three hours after a collision and the California court
held the evidence admissible. See cases collected Donigan,
supra, 1961 supplement, pages 20-21. In this regard, it
should be noted that those states having statutes limiting
the admissibility of blood tests taken subsequent to an accident usually provide that the test is admissible if taken any
time within two hours of the accident or arrest. Donigan,
supra, 42--43, 1961 supplement, 21.
The appellant argues that there is no evidence to contradict his statement as to the time of consumption of the
alcohol. It is submitted on the basis of the facts indicated
above that his testimony was in fact contradicted. Even so,
however, it is clear that the jury need not believe the appellant. In Commonwealth v. Hartman, 179 Penn. Supr.134,
115 A.2d 820 ( 1955), the same argument was urged before
the court. In rejecting it, the court noted:
"The only direct evidence as to the kind and quantity of intoxicants consumed by the defendant and the
time spent in drinking at the By-bar is in the testimony
of the defendant himself and that of his companion.
They both said that they arrived at the tavern after
3:00 P.M. when the defendant drank 'two beers' and
no more. The fact that the Commonwealth was not in
position to prove that the defendant came to the tavern
earlier in the day or that he consumed more than two
beers while there was not controlling on the question of
defendant's guilt. Defendant's credibility and that of
his witness were for the jury and the weight ascribed
to their testimony may have had a determining effect
on the result. The opinions of the police officers who
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examined defendant at the City Hall immediately
after the arrest, to the effect that in their opinion he
then was intoxicated went to the credibility of defendant and his witness. And clearly defendant's condition within one hour after his arrest, as shown by the
Intoximeter test on testimony which has not been questioned, was competent and relevant and was some evidence on the question of whether he was under the
influence of intoxicating liquor while driving his automobile at the time of the collision. The weight of the
evidence based on the rest of course was for the jury."
Although the case was reversed in Commonwealth v.
Hartman, 383 Penn. 461, 119 A.2d 211, it was reversed
only on the basis that the state could not appeal. The statement quoted on page 24 of the appellant's brief in fact is not
a statement of the appellate court, but the reasons which
the trial court gave in granting a new trial from which the
state appealed. Therefore, the case before the Pennsylvania
court in 115 A. 2d 820 ( 1950) is the highest appellate determination on the issue which is now urged by appellant and
that determination was adverse to appellant's present contentions. Under the circumstances of this case, it is apparent
that the evidence as to the blood alcohol test was a matter
for the jury's consideration and since the jury is the ultimate
judge of the credibility of a witness, the trial court did not
commit error in allowing the jury to weigh the blood alcohol test along with the other facts against the appellant's
claims. State v. Moore, 111 U. 458, 183 P.2d 973; State v.
Sullivan, 6 U.2d 110, 307 P.2d 212.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE STATE'S CASE; AND IN ANY
EVENT, THE APPELLANT HAVING GONE FORWARD
WITH HIS OWN CASE HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO
OBJECT.

The appellant contends that the trial court should have
dismissed the State's case at the end of the presentation of
its evidence because there was insufficient proof that the
appellant was guilty of the offense. It is submitted that there
is no merit to that contention. The evidence presented by
the State showed that the appellant drove erratically and
in a manner which would support an inference that he was
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Subsequent to
the accident, Mr. George Golightly detected the odor of
alcohol on the appellant's breath. This, when coupled with
his previous driving, would tend to support a conclusion
that the appellant was drunk. The appellant told police
officers that he either fell asleep or passed out. This would
tend to evidence a belief on the appellant's part that he had
consumed sufficient alcohol to cause him to pass out. This
supports a reasonable inference that the appellant was
drunk at the time he drove his vehicle over into the lane of
traffic in which the collision occurred, resulting in the death
of Fleming Christensen. Finally, the appellant's blood
alcohol level of .193, when measured against the statutory
presumptions set out in 41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated
1953, would tend to support the conclusion that the appellant was driving his vehicle while intoxicated and driving
it in such a manner to negligently cause the death of the
charged deceased. Although none of the facts standing
alone may in and of themselves be sufficient to warrant
the jury in convicting, the totality of the facts conclusively
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provide a basis for the jury's result. Further, even assuming
for the sake of argument that the trial court erred, the
appellant did not rely upon the State's evidence alone but
went forward with his own evidence and the appellant himself admitted the consumption of alcohol and did so under
circumstances which tended to impeach his credibility,
further supporting a conclusion that the appellant was
drunk at the time of the accident. Consequently, the appellant has waived any claim of error for the trial court's
failure to dismiss at the end of the State's case.
In Wigmore, Evidence~ § 2496, it is stated:
"Conversely, however, he cannot take advantage of
the judge's original erroneous refusal to direct a verdict
for insufficiency at the time of the first motion, (a) if
he does not renew the motion at the close of all the
evidence, or (b) or if at the time of the final motion
the ruling correctly refuses to order a verdict for insufficiency; for the Court is at that time entitled to
decide upon a survey of the whole evidence; and this
survey naturally renders any prior error immaterial.

***"
In the instant case, the trial court at the end of the presentation of all the evidence correctly refused to dismiss. This
being so, the appellant is in no position to claim error. In
State v. Denison, 352 Mo. 511, 178 S.W.2d 449 ( 1944),
the court said :
"Since appellant did not stand on it (first demurrer)
but presented evidence in his own behalf, the trial
court was bound to take the latter evidence into consideration insofar as it helped the State's case, in ruling
on the second demurrer at the close of the whole case."
Since the appellant chose to go forward with his case, the
only question for this court is whether the evidence at the
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time of submission of the case to the jury was such that the
jury could reasonably conclude the defendant's guilt. Since
the evidence is clearly sufficient to support the finding of the
appellant's guilt, there is no merit to his third point of error.
CONCLUSION
The evidence in this case is strong and direct, pointing
to the guilt of the appellant. The issues claimed for reversal
on appeal are incidental matters primarily within the discretion of the trial court. The posture of the case, both at
trial and on appeal, is such that this court has no other
alternative but to affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
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